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This paper attempts to evaluate wage rigidity related to risks of increased size and volatility of 
unemployment after the candidate countries enter the EMU. Such evaluation is done through the 
study of  past labour market adjustment mechanisms and, in particular, the role played by the 
exchange  rate  movements  and  independent  monetary  policy.  The  paper  examines  some 
institutional  and  structural  characteristics  of  candidate  countries  labour  markets  that  could 
influence the wage elasticity. The analysis indicates that generally nominal wages are not flexible 
in  candidate  countries.  Inflationary  surprises  and  nominal  exchange  rate  movements  have  an 
effect on the adjustment, especially during the Russian crisis. On the other hand fast productivity 
growth  creates  the environment  in  which  unit  labour  can  adjust  to  unfavourable  labour  market 
outcomes  through  moderation  of  real  wage  dynamics  despite  nominal  stickiness.  The  paper 
indicates possible fields of further in-depth research in this area.  









The future membership in the European and Monetary Union (EMU) is a logical and legal 
consequence of European Union (EU) accession and the debate about the economic rationale of 
joining  the  single  currency  would  be  of  limited  practical  importance.  Therefore,  the  policy 
discussion  in  recent  years  has  rightly  focused  on  practical  aspects  of  EMU  accession. 
Nevertheless it is excessively focused on the short-term strategy and timetable of meeting nominal 
convergence and fiscal criteria as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. We believe that more attention 
of  researchers  and  policy  makers  should  be  focused  on  factors  that  might  decide  whether 
participation in the monetary union is successful in longer run and policies to affect these factors.  
We show in this paper that it is the structure of labour market that is of particular importance 
for  minimizing  costs  of  EMU  membership.  Flexibility  in  wages  and  freedom  of  international 
migrations is essential for adjustment to asymmetrical shocks, when exchange rate are irrevocably 
fixed, monetary policy driven by union-wide consideration and the scope for fiscal policy response 
is limited. We attempt to evaluate risks of increased size and volatility of unemployment after the 
candidate countries’ accession to the EMU. We do it by studying past labour market adjustment 
mechanisms and in particular the role played by the exchange rate movements and independent 
monetary policy. We conclude that these risks might be lower than commonly believed, yet that the 
governments  have  the  significant  role  to  play  by  actively  promoting  reform  of  labour  market 
institutions. 
Section 1 introduces the question of labour market flexibility in the context of monetary union. 
Section 2 presents empirical evidence on channel of adjustments in candidate economies. Section 
3 presents some structural features of their labour markets in relation to earlier analysis. Section 4 
concludes.  
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2. Theoretical Background 
In the run-up to the EU accession, the increasing attention is paid to prospects of inevitable 
future accession to the EMU. The discussion is focused on the strategy and timetable of meeting 
nominal  convergence  and  fiscal  criteria  as  outlined  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  By  contrast, 
surprisingly little attention is paid to implications of the EMU membership for labour markets in 
candidate countries. But the performance of the labour market is likely to define the success of 
participation  in  the  EMU.  The  membership  poses  serious  risks:  within  the  union  the 
macroeconomic  policy  has  fewer  instruments  to  stabilize  output  at  a  level  close  to  the  full 
employment due to loss exchange rate flexibility and independent monetary policy. This might lead 
to  higher  or  more  volatile  unemployment  rates  unless  labour  markets  are  truly  flexible  or 
asymmetric  shocks  fully  eliminated.  These  considerations  are  debated  ever  since  the  seminal 
paper by Mundell (1961) introduced the concept of Optimal Currency Area (OCA) by discussing 
methods of overcoming asymmetric demand shocks.  
2.1  Theory of optimum currency area 
This implication of the OCA theory for the importance of increasing labour market flexibility in 
the monetary union can be illustrated in the simple framework suggested by De Grauwe (2000). 
Consider, an example of “Hungary” planning to join the EMU1. We assume that “Hungary”, after a 
period  of full  employment, experiences  negative  trade  shock, due  to  the  sudden  collapse  and 
irreversible loss of “Russian” export markets. Such shock can be represented as the downward 
shift in the aggregate demand curve in the “Hungarian” economy (Figure 1). As a result “Hungary” 
is likely to experience increase in current account deficit and deflationary pressures, that most 
likely  will  result  in  the  increase  in  unemployment.  We  assume  that  exposure  of  current  EMU 
members to “Russian” crisis is null, therefore the shock is truly asymmetrical and price in the EMU 
area are stable.  
Benefits of nominal depreciation 
Consider first the situation in which “Hungary” is still outside the monetary Union. It is clear that 
depreciation of the domestic currency can be beneficial and bring immediate adjustment. Although 
“forint” wages are rigid, the depreciation of “forint” can reduce EURO wages and subsequently 
improve competitiveness of “Hungarian” goods in the EU markets. This shifts aggregate demand 
curve  upwards  back  to  its  original  position  and  the  economy  returns  to  equilibrium  without 
experiencing painful reductions in domestic product prices and nominal wages or increased labour 
                                                 
1 In this theoretical section, names “Hungary” and “Russia” are used solely to illustrate theoretical concepts and not 
to describe actual developments in these countries.   
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migrations.  Degree  of  international  labour  mobility  and  nominal  flexibility  is  of  no  major 
consequence for unemployment dynamics2. 
Figure 1. Negative trade shock 
 
 
The  importance of nominal  wage  rigidities  increases dramatically  once  “Hungary”  joins  the 
EMU. After the accession, the exchange rate of the “Hungarian forint” is irreversible fixed to the 
EURO and monetary policy is conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB). As ECB policy is 
driven by assessment of union wide economic situation, for which “Hungarian” predicament due to 
its small relative size has little or no importance, there is no hope for loosened monetary policy3. 
“Hungary” is stuck in the situation of the current account deficit and high unemployment in which all 
burden of adjustment is thrust upon labour market flexibility.  
Increasing role of nominal wage flexibility 
One potential channel of adjustment operates through flexible nominal wages that according to 
Mundell is a perfectly good alternative to nominal exchange rate flexibility. If in a response to rising 
unemployment  “forint”  wages  and  consequently  prices  of  “Hungarian”  products  fall, 
competitiveness  of  the  economy  is  improved4.  In  the  Figure  2  this  can  be  illustrated  as  the 
rightward shift in the aggregate supply curve that brings economy back to the full employment 
position, while prices of output fall. The speed at which nominal wages fall seems to be the most 
essential factor of the size and duration of the unemployment problem in “Hungary”. Unfortunately, 
                                                 
2 We discuss in the next section why real wage rigidity might still be a problem. 
3 Probably, even if most candidate countries are strongly affected by the Russian crisis, the ECB would hardly take 
notice due to the low economic weight of the region.  
4 We define here nominal wage flexibility as the responsiveness of aggregate average nominal wages towards 
increasing unemployment, i.e. under hypothetical full rigidity, average wages do not fall even when unemployment is 
rapidly rising  This is an approach dictated by available data that do not capture important difference between wage 
responsiveness under existing and newly signed employment contracts. It is intuitive that the flexibility under the former 
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the conclusion of Jackman and Savouri (1998) is that “it seems unreasonable to think that degree 
of wage flexibility that characterizes European labour markets can substitute for exchange rate 
flexibility”. We attempt to verify whether this claim is true for candidate economies in the empirical 
part of this paper. 
Figure 2. Adjustment to negative trade shock: nominal wage cuts 
 
Missing labour mobility 
High  labour  mobility  is  another  crucial  substitute  for  flexibility  of  nominal  exchange  rates. 
Indeed  Mundell defines  OCA as the area  within factors of  production are  mobile but  immobile 
outside  as  “money  wages  and  prices  cannot  be  reduced  in  the  short  run  without  causing 
unemployment”. The mechanism of adjustment is very simple: “Hungarian” workers that lose jobs, 
instead of staying idle, seek employment opportunities outside the country eliminating imbalance in 
the  domestic  labour  market.  The  theoretical  insight  by  Mundell  is  supported  by  voluminous 
literature on the main adjustment mechanisms in existing common currency areas, notably USA 
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992). In all successful unions, migrations invariably play the most prominent 
role. However, Jackman and Savouri (1998) are very sceptical about the role of migrations as the 
main adjustment mechanism in EMU as available evidence brings them to simple conclusion that 
“labour mobility across national boundaries is essentially zero”. This views are shared even by 
authors most sympathetic to the creation of EMU: Patterson and Amati (1998) from the European 
Commission believe  that  “It  is  unlikely that greater  mobility of  labour, either  within  or between 
Member  States,  can  ever  become  a  major  instrument  of  adjustment  within  the  EU.”  Similarly, 
international migrations are very small in case of candidate countries. For example in years 1996-
1997 the annual migrations from Poland to the western countries were not higher then 30.000 
persons with a decreasing tendency (Orlowski 2002). 
Obviously  it  can  be  speculated  that  propensity  to  migrate  increases,  first,  when  candidate 
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problems  it  is  very  unlikely  to  happen  even  when  the  remaining  restrictions  on  freedom  of 
movement of labour from accession countries are removed. One of conclusions of Kupiszewski’s 
(2002) study of the large number of existing migration forecasts is, that total net population loss of 
Poland should not exceed 1 million over next 30 years. It means the average annual net migration 
of 33.000 persons. Firdmuc (2002) concludes his comprehensive study of pattern of interregional 
mobility in candidate countries with the blunt prediction: “Indeed, given the low responsiveness of 
labor mobility to regional unemployment and wages, it appears that the candidate countries may 
not be well equipped to deal with adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Transitional barriers to 
labor mobility in the wake of the enlargement would in fact only aggravate this problem. Hence, an 
early entry to the EMU could make the monetary union more fragile and be potentially costly both 
in economic and political terms”. We do not necessarily agree with the last conclusion but it is 
crucial  for  policymaker  to  remember  challenges  that  low  migrations  pose  for  the  monetary 
integration. 
5 
2.2  Beyond theory of OCA 
Under  the  monetary  union  with  low  labour  mobility,  nominal  downward  stickiness  prevents 
smooth adjustment to the negative asymmetric shock. Accordingly, theory of Optimal Currency 
Area suggests that successful participation in the EMU depends crucially on the nominal wage 
elasticity6. Related argument for increasing importance of nominal wage flexibility in the monetary 
union is based upon the proposition that independent monetary policy allows for reducing real 
wages through higher inflation7. Jackman and Savouri (1998) notice that “the evidence suggest 
that  as  inflation  falls,  the  sensitivity  of  nominal  wages  to  unemployment  falls“.  Assuming  that 
described  preposition  was  true,  stable  and  low  rates  of  inflation  associated  with  the  loss  of 
independent monetary policy could lead to more rigid real wages.   
Implications  for  empirical  work  seem  to  be  straightforward.  Countries  with  more  flexible 
nominal wages are better prepared to enter the union. Countries with nominal wage rigidity should 
seriously consider whether benefits from the EMU participation outweigh possible costs due to 
labour  market  maladjustments.  Accordingly,  in  view  of  observed  nominal  rigidities,  many 
researchers questioned net benefits and even viability of the monetary union in Europe (Feldstein, 
1997).  To  follow  this  line  of  argument  in  the  empirical  part  of  this  paper,  we  should  assess 
                                                 
5 We come back to the problem of internal migrations in candidate countries as the factor enhancing wage flexibility 
within  a country. 
6 Although Mundell (1961) considered labour migration to be a solution to adjustment problems within currency 
union in the world of nominally downward rigid wages and prices, it seems that opposite logic should apply to the 
feasibility study of the EMU. Fundamental barriers and low levels of international migrations in Europe, suggests that if 
anything it is the flexibility of wages that need to give way in order to deliver true adjustment mechanism.  
7 This potential role should not be confused with time inconsistent actions of the wet-nosed central banker. In the 
famous Barro-Gordon (1983) model, inflation is supposed to push unemployment below its equilibrium level. In our 
research, we assume that the best that monetary could potentially achieve is to speed up the adjustment to equilibrium 
level in the case of negative shock.   
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econometrically degree of nominal wage rigidities in candidate countries. However, this research 
strategy has number of difficulties that we discuss below. 
Role of productivity growth 
The  first  and  simplest  consideration  against  exclusive  focus  in  the  study  on  cost  of  EMU 
participation among candidate countries on nominal wage elasticity is that it ignores the role of high 
productivity growth.  Costs  of  monetary  union  are  related  to  decreased  competitiveness due  to 
nominal downward wage stickiness in the absence of exchange rate depreciation or rigidity of real 
wages due to low and stable inflation. But what matters for hiring and firing decisions are domestic 

















DULC =  
where: W is wage in domestic currency, E is nominal exchange rate, P is aggregate price level,  
P* is foreign price level, Q is real output and L is employment.  
When productivity is growing fast (and rapidly rising productivity is exactly what is expected to 
happen as part of real convergence process) both measures of unit labour costs can be reduced 
even at rigid wages. In other words, even when “forint” wages and therefore also EURO and real 
wages are rigid downwards and employment falls in a short run as the immediate result of a shock, 
rising productivity may by itself (without the need for reduction of any measure of wages) lead to 
relatively quick reduction of ULCs. This in turn allows restoring employment. A rarely formulated 
implication  emerges:  faster  growing  candidate  countries  are  likely  to  be  ceteris  paribus  more 
successful members of the EMU, not because of faster nominal adjustment but thanks to more 
favourable adjustment environment due to high productivity growth. 
Doubts about benefits of flexible exchange rates and national monetary policy 
Another problem of research strategy directed at the study of nominal wage flexibility relates to 
rather optimistic representation of the role that exchange rate flexibility and independent monetary 
policy have in practice: it is implicit that following asymmetric shock, exchange rate depreciation or 
monetary expansion can help to restore the equilibrium in labour markets. But this view is based 
on crucial assumptions that were subsequently questioned.  
First it is assumed that nominal exchange rates move and independent monetary policy is 
conducted in the way that is likely to equilibrate labour markets. And here many authors expressed 
serious doubts. Viñals (1996) has observed that ".. recent experience suggests that the usefulness 
of the nominal exchange rate as a tool for macroeconomic adjustment within the European Union 
is very questionable in a world of free capital movements, where foreign exchange markets are 
often subject to self-fulfilling speculative crises which take the exchange rate away for prolonged 
periods  from  where  fundamentals  suggest  it  should  be."  If  financial  shocks  are  important  the 
observation by Ochel (1997) is particularly important: " Asymmetrical financial shocks can be better  
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dealt with in a monetary union than in a system with adjustable exchange rates and are thus not an 
additional  source of unemployment".  Even  more  importantly,  Bayoumi and  Eichengreen  (1994) 
underline the role of policy induced shocks: “Policy makers may systematically misuse policy rather 
than employ it to facilitate adjustment, (...) if domestic policy itself is the source of the disturbances, 
monetary unification with a group of countries less susceptible to such pressures may imply a 
welfare improvement".  
Invalidity  of  assumption  about  usefulness  of  flexible  exchange  rates  and  independent 
monetary  policy  might  easily  reverse  implications  of  the  theory  for  the  role  of  labour  market 
flexibility: if exchange rate movements and independent monetary policy are sources of shocks 
rather  than  useful  adjustment  mechanisms,  the  country  with  the  least  flexible  wages,  has  the 
largest  interest  in  joining  the  area  of  stable  inflation
8.  Therefore, potential  costs of  abandoning 
flexible exchange rates and independent monetary policy for labour markets cannot be assessed 
without analysis of their effectiveness. 
Secondly, in order to believe that depreciation of the currency or expansionary monetary policy 
can indeed reduce unit labour costs when unemployment is above its equilibrium rate and nominal 
wages are rigid, it is necessary to assume, respectively, that:  i) nominal depreciation might lead to 
improved competitiveness or reduction in real EURO wages W/EP*, ii) wages are not rigid in real 
terms  so  that  inflation  can  reduce  real  wages  W/P.  The  relationship  between  these  two 
assumptions  is  clear.  While  the  positive  role  of  inflationary  policy  requires  at  least  temporary 
money illusion, effective depreciation requires money illusion or low correlation between exchange 
rate movements and domestic price level, i.e. flexible real exchange rate P/EP*.  
It follows that high nominal wage rigidity does not need to the argument against participation in 
the monetary union. If real wages W/P are rigid in the sense that nominal wage dynamics follow 
closely inflation, monetary regime is mostly irrelevant for labour market outcomes. The same is 
true for smaller countries for which there is high pass-through from exchange rates to prices (rigid 
P/EP*). "For small economies in which imports are so important a component of the cost of living 
that a reduction in real wages through nominal depreciation is rapidly feed through into domestic 
prices” (Obstfeld, 1985). Indeed since McKinnon (1963) one of main criteria for the choice between 
fixed and flexible exchange rates was the degree of openness in an economy, characterized by 
relative importance of traded to non-traded goods. 
To be specific, if Hungary had rigid real wages, the loss of flexible exchange rates should 
prove irrelevant from in the sense it does not hurt the adjustment potential of the economy. For 
larger country like Poland, high real wage rigidity might indeed imply higher potential costs of EMU 
accession. This is the case because nominal depreciation is more likely to be translated into real 
depreciation (falling P/EP*). “The thesis of those who favour flexible exchange rates is that the 
community in question is not willing to accept variations in its real income through adjustments in 
                                                 
8 This point was brought to our attention by Jacek Rostowski.  
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its money wage rate or price level, but that is willing to accept virtually the same changes in its real 
income through variations in the rate of exchange” (Mundell 1961). 
Indeed there is some empirical evidence that nominal depreciation can be useful in improving 
competitiveness. First, real wage and price levels seem to fluctuate more among countries with 
independent currencies than in regions within currency area (De Grauwe and Vanhavebeke 1993, 
von  Hagen  and  Neumann  1994)
9.  There  is  also  number  of  recent  episodes  when  devaluation 
provided  competitiveness  boost  and  helped  to  reduce  unemployment.  The  most  often  cited 
example is the UK withdrawal from the EMS in 1992: according to most authors devaluation and 
monetary  expansion  contributed  to  subsequent  decade  of  economic  recovery  without  visible 
inflationary consequences (Jackman and Savouri, 1998). Another well known episode proves that 
devaluations can be “a great success” even in relatively small economy: devaluation in Belgium in 
1982  had  strong  and  lasting  positive  impact  on  current  account  deficit  and  employment  (De 
Grauwe,  2000).  We  are  curious  whether  we  can  actually  deduct  similar  recent  episodes  in 
candidate countries – their presence is crucial for the assessment of need for increasing flexibility 
in labour markets after their accession to the EMU. 
Lucas Critique and prospect for labour market reform 
The  last  and  most  fundamental  problem  with  the  exclusive  focus  on  the  measurement  of 
nominal wage flexibility is Lucas Critique: estimates derived under one policy regime have very 
limited value of in predicting developments under different policy regime. When monetary policy is 
independent and exchange rate fluctuates, improvement in competitiveness or reduction in real 
wages does not necessary require nominal flexibility. Observed nominal rigidity is likely to be high, 
what  may  tempt  a  conclusion  about  undesirability  of  monetary  union.  Indeed,  none  of  the 
candidate countries with independent monetary policy studied in this article ever recorded falling 
nominal wages. Taken at the face value, this fact leads to overestimation of problems related to 
nominal rigidities and might wrongly discourage accession to the monetary union. Moreover, we 
discuss below a good proof that monetary policy framework matters a great deal for nominal labour 
market flexibility: Lithuania is the only country that experienced nominal wage cuts and it happened 
under currency board arrangement, that for our purposes is essentially equivalent to the monetary 
union participation. Introduction of the monetary union has therefore an impact on decisions of 
economic  agents  and  workers  that  were  able  to  accept  real  wage  cuts  in  high  inflation 
environment,  might  potentially  accept  nominal  wage  cuts  in  fully  credible  stable  price 
environment10. Any measure of current nominal rigidity is therefore of limited relevance for the 
evaluation of likely costs of EMU participation. However, interactions between creation of monetary 
union  and  incentives  for  structural  reforms  in  Europe  are  not  straightforward  and  increasing 
                                                 
9  There  are  however  different  factors  that might  contribute  to  this  result:  notably  currency  areas  corresponded 
historically to countries, which through institutional set up and redistributive policies tended to compress regional wage 
and price differentials.  
10 This does not necessarily contradict the evidence from Jackman (1998) about falling nominal wages rigidity once 
inflation  is  lower,  which  was  provided  in  the  context  of  unchanged  independent  and  potentially  inflationary  policy 
framework.   
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flexibility in labour markets cannot be taken for granted. Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2001) note with 
some irony that although unemployment is the Europe’s most important problem, all the efforts of 
European policies were directed towards unified monetary policy, possibly at the cost of labour 
market reform. Calmfors (1998) argues openly that countries that followed tough macroeconomic 
policies directed at the EMU membership, largely neglected labour reforms, while they took place 
in Britain staying outside the union.  
Still Calmfors (1998), among many others, believe that given the constraint on active use of 
exchange rate and monetary policy in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks, incentives for reform 
would  increase  once  the  EMU  is  in  place.  This  is  so  called  TINA  (There  Is  No  Alternative) 
argument. On the other hand, Sibert and Sutherland (2000) show that labour reform might be less 
attractive in monetary union, because reduction of inflation bias is not an argument for the reform 
anymore:  creation  of  the  monetary  union  removes  time  inconsistency  problem originating from 
domestic market imperfections. Vinals and Jimeno (1998) also show that there is higher positive 
externality  from  labour  reform  under  the  monetary  union,  so  that  incentives  for  uncoordinated 
reforms are reduced. Some authors, notably Gordon (1996) underline that outside the EMU the 
“two—handed” strategies might be implemented: labour market reforms addressing supply side 
might be combined with monetary policy on demand side. Expansionary monetary policy makes 
structural reforms more attractive: results are seen immediately, but such policy can be expected 
from the ECB only if reforms in member countries are coordinated. And such coordination might be 
very difficult to achieve. Accordingly, Blanchard and Jimeno (1999) argue that within EMU Spain 
would have to “decrease the unemployment rate with one of its two hands tied behind its back”.  
Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2001) offer a solution to this controversy by distinguishing two kinds 
of labour reforms: those speeding up adjustment to shocks and those changing natural rate of 
unemployment. An incentive for the former kind of reform which involves mainly higher nominal 
flexibility is likely to be increased within the EMU in line with TINA principle. Unfortunately, an 
incentive  for  the  latter  kind  of  reform  that  involves  more  ambitious  and  deeper  changes  in 
European labour markets might be reduced by the EMU membership.  
3. Empirical Investigation 
3.1  Understanding adjustment mechanisms 
From the discussion above it is clear that econometric estimation of nominal as well as real 
wage rigidity is unlikely to give robust insights about potential costs of participation in the EMU 
unless importance of exchange rate, price and productivity movements are analysed at the same 
time. In our view, the only sensible research strategy is to understand mechanisms of adjustments 
in labour markets in candidate countries in recent years and then carefully discuss potential impact 
of accession to the monetary union on these mechanisms. In line with discussion above, we define 
overall labour market elasticity as the response of two described measures of unit labour costs to  
                                                 Studies & Analyses  No. 265 – Artur Radziwiłł, Mateusz Walewski 
15 
changes in the unemployment. Adjustments might take place through nominal wages, prices and 
nominal exchange rate that determine real wage dynamics (W/P), deprecation of real exchange 
rate (P/EP*) and consequently of real EURO wages (W/EP*), as well as through improvements in 
productivity.  
We  focus  on  changes  as  it  is  very  difficult  to  identify  structural  and  cyclical  elements  of 
unemployment in candidate countries and our preliminary econometric investigation suggested that 
unit labour costs reacted to changes rather than levels of unemployment. We are particularly but 
not  exclusively  interested  in  mechanisms  and  size  of  adjustments  at  times  of  raising 
unemployment.  Our  primary  goal  is  to  understand  the  role  exchange  rate  movements  and 
monetary policy played, as accession to the union implies the need for replacing these labour 
market  adjustment  mechanisms.  OCA  provides  insights  into  the  role  of  exchange  rate  policy: 
exchange  rate  depreciation  potentially  produces  boost  to  employment  by  reducing  real  EURO 
wages  and  international  ULC.  Inflationary  surprise  might  reduce  real  wages and  domestic unit 
labour costs. We try to verify whether exchange rate movements and monetary policy played such 
role in reality.  
Given the relation between two measures of unit labour costs,  and  the  direct 
interest of workers in real rather than EURO wages, we conduct investigation in two stages. First we 
examine closely size and factors of adjustments in the domestic unit labour costs. Secondly, we pose 
the  question,  whether  nominal  exchange  rate  movements  provided  boost  to  competitiveness  by 
depreciating  real  exchange  rate  and  therefore  reducing  real  EURO  wages  at  times  of  rising 
unemployment. We study the variation in EURO exchange rates instead of nominal effective exchange 
rates. The reason is that it is exactly the size and adjustment role of previous variations against the 
common currency that is crucial for the potential cost of joining the monetary union. If for example past 
huge variation towards currencies of important trade partners such as US or Russia were consistent 
with stable EURO exchange rate, the participation in the EMU would not cause any potential trouble. In 
other words, these are real exchange movements of currencies of candidate countries against Euro, 
that might have been a result of shocks idiosyncratic for these countries11.  
Obviously, it is impossible to fully avoid the Lucas Critique problem: based on current situation 
we cannot judge well how structural aspects of labour market change after the EMU accession. 
Our strategy is however, at least in this respect, superior to mechanistic econometric investigation 
of  wage flexibility, as  it  puts this problem at  the  core  of  investigation: We explicitly  study how 
patterns of adjustment and overall labour market flexibility might change upon accession. As an 
additional  benefit,  we  can  compare  adjustment  mechanisms  in  candidate  countries  that  still 
conduct independent monetary policy and those with currency board regime (Lithuania) or quasi-
currency board regime (Latvia). In our analysis of actual adjustment patterns in selected candidate 
countries, we always focus on our main research problem: potential impact of EMU accession on 
labour market performance. It is however also worth noting that one of interesting results of this 
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research  is  the  diversity  in  adjustment  patterns,  even  in  this  relatively  homogeneous  group  of 
countries. 
 
3.2  Country experience 
Our investigation is based on quarterly data compiled by the International Monetary Fund in its 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database for six candidate countries joining EU in 2004: 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. Unfortunately not adequate data 
was available for Estonia and Slovenia. Dataset actually used was further updated and completed 
with statistics from national statistical offices and central banks and covers period between 1993 
and 2002. In our analysis of policy responses we concentrate on period since 1995.  
Figure 3. 
GDP real growth rates  Unemployment rates 
   
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
We start with discussion of basic trends in real growth and unemployment. (Figure 3) GDP 
growth rates are generally positive and correlated across countries with the exception of the Czech 
Republic. This common pattern is particularly dominated by one important shock: Russian crisis in 
1998. Growth rates plunged in all countries following the crisis and in none of them recovered to 
the pre-crisis rates so far. What is also characteristic is that following the Russian crisis growth 
performance is more heterogeneous across countries. This shock was particularly important for 
Baltic States with strong trade and financial links with Russia and other CIS countries: Lithuania 
indeed  experienced  deep  recession  in  1999.  Moreover,  Baltic  States  could  not  use  monetary 
response to cushion the crisis, yet their recovery proved as prompt and strong as the crisis itself. 
Economic  performance  in  last  years  in  Czech  Republic  was  markedly  different  than  in  other 
candidate countries. Currency crisis in 1997 led to the economic recession at times at the peak 
performance of other countries prior to the Russian crisis. Hungarian economic turmoil of 1995 had 



























                                                 Studies & Analyses  No. 265 – Artur Radziwiłł, Mateusz Walewski 
17 
what distinguishes Poland’s performance is marked economic slowdown in most recent years what 
produced characteristic double dipped pattern. 
The importance of the crisis in 1998 is even clearer for the unemployment rates12. Average 
unemployment rates fell moderately between 1994 and 1998 from above 9% to around 8% but 
following  the  crisis  increased  markedly  to  12%.  Also  until  1998  unemployment  rates  in  most 
countries seemed to converge. In beginning of 1994 the highest unemployment rate in our sample 
was almost five times larger than the lowest and the spread between the two was 13 percentage 
points.  In forth  quarter  of  1998,  the  ratio  was only  1.5 and  spread  3.5 percentage points. But 
following Russian crisis unemployment rates seem to diverge: by the end of 2002, the ratio of 
highest and lowest rates increased to 3 and spread to 12 percentage points. The impression of 
convergence/divergence  cycle  is  created  mainly  by  V-shaped  developments  in  Poland  and 
Slovakia.  
In  our  study  of  labour  market  adjustment  we  will  naturally  focus  on  crisis  episodes.  Crisis 
situations provide natural experiments of reaction to adverse shocks that can be readily analysed. 
More  importantly  they  relate  directly  to  the  problem  at  hand,  as  it  is  a  fear  about  adverse 
asymmetric shock that undermines the most the desire to participate in the monetary union. What 
is  clear  even  from  this  introductory  discussion,  countries  without  independent  monetary  policy 
managed to restore equilibrium not less effectively than others. We also study success and failure 
stories in our sample. For example Hungary managed to continuously reduce unemployment rates 
till 2001. The opposite was true for Czech Republic, which nevertheless retained unemployment 
rates lower than Poland or Slovakia. While these dynamics are partly due to structural changes, we 
try to study to what extent exchange rate movements and monetary policy can be credited or 
blamed for them. In the section below we study adjustment patterns in the domestic unit labour 
costs. 
3.2.1 Wage rigidities and adjustment in domestic unit labour costs 
Czech Republic   
Czech Republic experienced a long period of GDP slump in years 1996-1999 with GDP growth 
bottoming in mid 1997.(Figure 4) This slump resulted in rapid unemployment rate increase from 
around 4 percent in the mid of 1996 to the maximum of about 10 percent in the beginning of 2000. 
When economic growth returned, unemployment remained at this higher level. During the initial 
period of unemployment growth between the second half of 1996 and mid of 1997 domestic unit 
labour costs (DULC) continued to grow and did not help to ease the problem. Only for a short 
period in years 1997-98, sharp decline of real wages prevented larger increases in unemployment. 
Then DULC stabilised. In this section below we investigate whether relative inflexibility of domestic 
                                                 
12 There were other factors contributing to lower growth rates and higher unemployment rates such as stagnation in the 
EU/US economies and costs of opening to EU markets. The role of domestic labour market rigidities in adjusting to the 
Russian crisis is discussed at length below.  
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unit labour costs to deteriorating situation in the labour market happened in spite of correcting or 
perhaps partially because harmful actions of monetary policy.  
Real wages do not seem to adjust, with the long run dynamics staying more or less in line with 
productivity  changes.  Even  the  short  run  real  wage  decrease  in  years  1997-1998  has  been 
preceded  by  similar  negative  shock  to  productivity.  Results  of  simple  econometric  estimation 
suggest  that  real  wages  are  not  negatively  correlated  with  unemployment  in  Czech  Republic. 
Regressing real wage dynamics on unemployment level and dynamics, and productivity changes 
does not produce any significant results. The lack of adjustment in real wage dynamics in Czech 
Republic, after the initial deep slump in 1997 seems to be strictly related to nominal wage rigidity in 
this  country.  After  nominal  wage  growth  adjustment  in  years  1996-1997,  they  kept  rising  at 
relatively stable rate and they did not react to the pronounced unemployment increase that took 
place in 1999. We can also see that the real wage decrease during the crisis was more the effect 
of  the  inflation  surprise  than  nominal  wage  adjustment.  Without  the  inflation  surprise  Czech 
workers would not experience the fall in real wages even during the hardest period of crisis and 
falling productivity.  
It seems that nominal wages in Czech Republic are relatively sticky, (similarly as in the Polish 
case  below).  What  is  different  however  is  the  lack  of  clear  level  adjustment  of  DULC  as  the 
reaction to rising unemployment since real wages follow the productivity path and on average grow 
faster than productivity13. The relative rigidity of not only nominal wages but also of DULC, as well 
as its upward trend predicts long term problems of labour market in Czech Republic, whether or 
not it joins the EMU, although at crisis situation monetary policy proved useful in pushing unit 
labour cost downwards.   
                                                 
13 It might obviously be the result of much better then Polish labour market situation with unemployment rate being 
less then half of Polish one. However, the difference in levels is a consequence of the more favourable structural 
characteristics  of  the  Czech  labour  market  with  much  higher  share  of  modern  industry  and  much  lower  share  of 
agriculture inherited from communist period.  
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Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
Slovakia 
Unemployment rate in Slovakia was falling in 1995, bottomed out at around 11-12% between 
1996 and 1998 and boosted rapidly to 19% at the end 1999. Small-scale fluctuations reduced 
unemployment rate in 2001 and increased it in 2002. In Slovakia, unemployment dynamics were 
particularly well reflected in the domestic unit labour costs. DULC were increasing precisely at 
times of falling unemployment. Evidence also points to strong hysteresis effect: while changes in 
unemployment exert  pressures  on  DULC,  a  level  of  unemployment  seems  to  be  irrelevant  for 
DULC. Results of regressing real wages on unemployment changes and levels do confirm this 
observation,  with  significant  coefficient  only  for  unemployment  differences.  In  Figure  5  we 
investigate channels of adjustments in DULC and we focus in particular on the role played by the 
independent monetary policy. From our reading of the evidence this role was higher than in any 
other country in our sample. 
While  before  1998  unemployment  rate  was  relatively  high  but  stable,  the  real  challenge 
happened in 1999, when the fallout of Russian crisis coincided with initiation of necessary and 
rapid structural reforms by the new government with immediate negative impact on GDP growth  
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rates  and  employment.  Real  wages  were  the  main  adjustment  mechanism  to  resulting  rapid 
increase in unemployment. But real wage cuts that took place in 1999 had much to do with the 
increased inflation while nominal wage growth remained stable throughout analysed period. This 
nominal wage inflexibility is particularly worrying during the most recent disinflation process, what 
explains the increase in both real wages and DULC. 
To sum up, Slovakia is a country in which inflationary impulse was effective in pushing down 
real wages in reaction to rapidly increasing unemployment rate. On the other hand nominal wages 
are  not  very  responsive  to  disinflation.  Finally  improvement  in  productivity  is  not  an  important 
channel of adjustment to negative shocks. These results suggest that participation in the monetary 
union  will  be  costly.  It  is  possible  on  the  other  hand  that  nominal  rigidity  is  exactly  due  to 
experience of active monetary policy and would be removed when the country joins the EMU. 
Although  this  possibility  could  be  questioned  taking  into  account  the  lack  of  nominal  wage 
adjustment to the disinflation in 2001 –2002, a better credibility of the low inflation policy might 
change this maladjustment pattern. 
Figure 5. Channels of adjustments in labour market: Slovakia 
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Hungary 
Figure  6  illustrates  major  adjustments  in  labour  market  in  Hungary.  Unemployment  rate  in 
Hungary was falling continuously from 11.5% in 1994 to 5.6% in 2001. Given such favourable 
trend, not even broken during economic slowdown of 1994-1995 downward adjustment in domestic 
unit labour costs were not necessary and DULC remained stable through most of the period till 
2001. It happened as real wages were rising in line with productivity growth. This moderation could 
be one of the factors that allowed for sustained fall in unemployment, which has been broken just 
recently together with a sharp rise in DULC. In the context of this research it is natural to ask 
whether monetary policy played any role in limiting real wage pressure till 2001 and whether it did 
have any influence on the rapid deterioration of this favourable trend.  
Particularly stable and moderate real wage growth between 1998 and 2001, was not generally 
supported by inflationary surprises. On contrary, it was adjustment in nominal wage dynamics that 
had to compensate disinflation process. Therefore, in this period classical dichotomy seems to hold 
well. However, there are two episodes when substantial real wage changes cannot be explained 
by productivity changes: GDP slump of 1995 and most recent quarters. It seems that monetary 
policy played important role in both periods. In the earlier one high inflation combined with decline 
in nominal wage dynamics (fall from more then 25 percent in end of 1994 to around 15 in half of 
1995) led to deep cuts in real wages and domestic unit labour costs and only part of this reduction 
was reversed by high nominal wage increases in 1997. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
rapid  short  time  inflation  surprise  and  nominal  wage  moderation  in  1995/1996  contributed  to 
subsequent unemployment rate decline.   
On the other hand rising real wages in 2002 are not only due to the increasing nominal wage 
dynamics but also due to the absence of the wage growth adjustment to fast disinflation. As a 
result  DULC  have  markedly  increased  what  probably  contributed  to  the  deterioration  of 
unemployment  situation.  Nominal  wage  growth  acceleration  at  the  time  of  falling  inflation  was 
partly due to the statutory increase in minimum wages. It might suggest that it was one-time effect; 
on the other hand it can lead to permanent reduction in nominal wage flexibility. More importantly 
in the context of this research, increase of DULC in 2002 illustrates also perils of volatile inflation 
and reversed inflationary surprise: after two years of fluctuating at 10%, inflation fell rapidly below 
5% in 2002 and this change was not reflected in nominal wage setting. 
To  sum  up,  Hungary  seems  to  have  rather  inflexible  nominal  wages  with  exception  of 
economic slump of 1995 but even at that time inflation surprises played an important role in shifting 
DULC. The option of inflating proved useful at the time of national emergency in 1995. It seems 
that participation in the EMU at that time could have led to less favourable domestic unit labour 
cost and unemployment dynamics. At less turbulent times loss of monetary independence should 
not have important impact on labour market adjustments. In particular, conservative but stable 
monetary  policy  would  prevent  problems  of  adjustments  to  rapidly  falling  inflation  a  rate  that 
characterised year 2002.  
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Figure 6. Channels of adjustments in labour market: Hungary 
   
   
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
Poland 
The most interesting period from the point of view of our research is the period after 1998 as 
before Poland experienced high economic growth with stabilised and then falling unemployment 
(see Figure 7). During that time the long run real wage growth followed the rise in productivity 
keeping the average DULC of the Polish economy unchanged. It seems that wage moderation 
facilitated the fall in unemployment rate in this period. Since the year 1998 unemployment started 
to rise very rapidly and keeps rising till the very end of our analysis period in 2002 accompanying 
slowdown of GDP dynamics. DULC deeply decreased at the very beginning of that period and then 
keep  decreasing  thereafter.  It  indicates  for  the  overall  flexibility  of  labour  costs  in  Poland. 
Decomposition of DULC dynamics (Figure 7) clearly shows that productivity dynamics have 
been rather stable during the entire analysed period, (with an important exception in 1999 – see 
below). Average annual growth rate of productivity in years 1996-1998 was 4,6 percent and for 
years 2000-2002  was  4,4 percent.  Real  wages behaved differently.  The annual growth  of  real 
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positive but much lower then at times of falling unemployment.14. It is however also very important 
what are the mechanics of this flexibility. Real wages may fall as the result of two processes: 
decrease in nominal wages (or nominal wage dynamics) or due to not-indexed inflation increase. It 
is quite obvious that being in the EURO area means that nominal wage adjustment is the only way 
to achieve real wage reduction in case of an asymmetric shock. It seems that the only period of 
decreasing real wages was both the result of change in price and in nominal wage dynamics, with 
the earlier being the dominating factor. This observation is also confirmed by the results of simple 
short-run econometric estimation where nominal wage growth changes are mostly determined by 
inflation  changes  and  unemployment  variable  is  of  only  marginal  importance.  Real  wages 
decreased in the second half of 2000 more as a result of inflation surprise than of relaxation of 
nominal wage pressure that occurred at that time. It is not good news from the point of view of 
Poland’s EURO zone accession.  
On the other hand, neither nominal nor real wages (although growing) have come back to its 
pre-1999 dynamics allowing DULC to decrease constantly since that period. It lets one to assess 
that in the EURO area, when inflation shock could not be even partial engine of the real wage 
adjustment, nominal wages would possibly react with similar results, at least in the longer time 
span. Even more importantly, high productivity growth rates will allow for reductions in domestic 
unit  labour  costs  during  participation  in  the  monetary  union,  even  if  nominal  wage  stickiness 
remains a major problem. In this respect, particularly important was the adjustment to growing 
unemployment in 1999, when impressive improvements in productivity took place. As it was not 
reflected  in  higher  real  wage  dynamics  a  deep  reduction  in  DULC  was  achieved.  It  points  to 
interesting  adjustment  mechanism:  under  high  productivity  growth  rates  the  space  for  DULC 
reductions is large even when real wages are downward sticky.   
                                                 
14 This relative flexibility of real wages in Poland is also partially proved by the results of a simple econometric 
estimation. We have regressed the real wage percentage  changes on both unemployment rate and unemployment 
change (productivity and autoregressive term have also been included in equation) and we obtained the significant 
coefficient (-0.86) on the change only. The coefficient on unemployment level is insignificant and perversely signed. Both 
of that would indicate for some level of unemployment hysteresis in Poland that could explain the increase of real wage 
dynamics since 2001, when unemployment dynamics stabilised. Hysteresis may result in prolonging unemployment 
problem and law activity of population, as we have currently witness.  
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Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
Latvia 
Latvia is the first of two our countries operating under the conditions of limited monetary and 
exchange rate policy freedom. Specifically, Latvia has formally fixed exchange rate to SDR and its 
monetary base is permanently covered by net foreign assets at more than 100%, what leaves very 
limited scope for independent monetary policy. During the analysed period unemployment rate in 
Latvia seems to be much more stable then in other analysed countries with exception of Hungary. 
Before the Russian crisis in 1998 it started even to decline as the result of very high economic 
growth and this decline has been accompanied by sharp increase of real wages. Unfortunately the 
Russian crisis of 1998 resulted in the sharp GDP slow down and unemployment also picked to 
more then 10 percent in the beginning of 1999.(Figure 8) 
Even this rise, however has been much smaller then in other countries, such as Slovakia, 
Poland or even Czech Republic. It seems to be the result of sharp adjustment of DULC that took 
place as a consequence of the unemployment growth. Afterwards, in spite of improving labour 
market situation, DULC have never regained its positive dynamics till the end of 2002 facilitating 
the recovery process. Earlier during the GDP slump in 1995-1996 unemployment level did not 
change at all, presumably also as the result of the DULC adjustment that took place during that 
time.  
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The negative DULC dynamics since 1998 are both the effect of moderate real wage growth in 
years  1998-2001  and  very  high  productivity  dynamics  during  the  entire  analysed  period. 
Productivity was rising even during the very moment of Russian crisis. Earlier, during the first GDP 
slump in 1995-1996 real wages reached negative dynamics, leading to DULC decrease and not 
letting unemployment  to  boost.  Real  wages followed  productivity growth only once,  just before 
Russian crisis, nevertheless it seems to have been only incidental phenomenon. 
Although nominal wage dynamics fell twice in Latvia leading to real wage adjustment it does 
not  seem  to  be  the  main  factor  deciding  about  the  relatively  good  and  stable  labour  market 
situation in this country. These are rather general wage growth moderation combined with favourite 
productivity  dynamics  producing  continuos  DULC  fall  that  facilitates  declines  in  unemployment 
rates. This situation is in opposition to what we have observed especially in Slovakia and Czech 
Republic and also to some extent Poland where inflation surprises led to most serious real wage 
adjustments.  This  characteristic  of the  Latvian  labour  market,  if preserved  in  the future,  would 
continue  to  be  the  big  advantage  in  case  of  adverse  asymmetric  shock  after  the  EURO  area 
accession of this country.  
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Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
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Lithuania 
Lithuania is the country with the currency board regime, which implies that it cannot conduct 
independent monetary policy. Inflationary surprise may not reduce domestic unit labour costs in 
case of raising unemployment. Moreover due to its tight trade links with Russia and other CIS 
countries  prior  to  1998,  financial  crisis  in  Russia  sent  the  economy  into  a  deep  recession. 
Unemployment  that  was  at  the  relatively  low  level  (6-8%)  increased  markedly  in  1998  until 
reaching its peak of 13% at end of 2000 and started to fall gradually ever since. (Figure 9) 
Domestic unit labour costs response was not immediate but impressively strong. During last 
quarters before the crisis, real wages were growing much faster than productivity and real wages 
continued to grow moderately in 1999. However, rapid increase in unemployment finally forced 
very  strong  adjustment  in  2000.  As  a  result  real  wages  plunged  and  given  very  low  level  of 
inflation, adjustment took place though reductions in nominal wages. Actually Lithuania is the only 
country in which nominal wage cut, absolute fall not only adjustment in dynamics, took place. Since 
that time real wages grow more slowly then productivity leading to constant DULC reduction.  
The example of Lithuania shows that deep adjustment in real wages in possible under the 
monetary union if nominal wages are flexible enough. It is however difficult to judge, whether this 
flexibility is a inherent feature of the Lithuanian labour market or the necessity of dealing with crisis 
situation in the currency board arrangement forced flexibility on the economy. One-year lag, the 
actual adjustment came with is the argument for the latter being true.  
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Figure 9. Channels of adjustments in labour market: Lithuania 
   
   
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
3.2.2 Real depreciation and adjustment in international labour costs 
In  this  section  we  investigate  whether  changes  in  EURO  exchange  rates  of  candidate 
countries’ currencies performed the role of unemployment adjustment mechanism as suggested by 
the OCA theory. Having examined rigidities of nominal and real wages in the section above this 
problem  can be addressed  relatively  simply.  First  question  is  whether nominal  exchange  rates 
affected real exchange rates or were fully reflected in price dynamics. As it was discussed in the 
theoretical section above, the first scenario is more likely in a larger and less open country like 
Poland and the second scenario should characterize all smaller countries in our sample. Provided 
that nominal depreciation is indeed effective, the second test is whether it is useful in the sense 
that currency indeed depreciates at times of increasing unemployment and falling competitiveness. 
From the Table 1, it is clear that while changes in the nominal exchange rate are strongly 
contemporaneously correlated with real exchange rates in most countries, after only three quarters 
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EURO exchange rate movements provide some short-term relief, they are unlikely to play any 
major role in medium term adjustments. 
Table 1. Nominal depreciation effectiveness 
  Correlation between annual rates  
of nominal and real depreciations 
  Immediate  After 1 quarter  After 3 quarters 
Czech Republic  0.81  0.47  -0.29 
Slovakia  0.86  0.54  -0.28 
Hungary  0.88  0.73  0.36 
Poland  0.57  0.33  -0.08 
Latvia  0.45  0.24  -0.13 
Lithuania  0.19  -0.04  -0.42 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
* quarterly data since 1994 (1995 for Baltic States) 
In the second step, we try to determine whether timing of exchange rate movements suggest 
that  they  were  responding  to  the  unemployment  and  competitiveness  problems  of  candidate 
economies. We know that for Baltic States the answer is negative: exchange rate movements of 
countries  with  extreme  form  of  hard  peg  (Latvia  to  SDR,  Lithuania  US  dollar)  were  caused 
exclusively by cross rates of world major currencies. But also in other countries nominal exchange 
rate does not seem supportive to labour market adjustments for most of times. In Poland since 
2000,  in  Hungary  and  Czech  Republic  since  2001  EURO  exchange  rate  appreciates  despite 
continuously  rising  unemployment.  Only  in  Slovakia  nominal  depreciation  in  1998  and  1999 
seemed to follow increasing unemployment. The only episode when exchange rates proved to be 
useful,  although  short  lasting,  adjustment  mechanism  was  the  aftermath  of  Russian  crisis. 
Practically in all countries, exchange rates depreciated in response to the serious or very serious 
trade shock, that was basically asymmetrical against existing EMU members. It shall be noted 
however, that exchange rates response was weak and quickly reversed. (Figure 10). 15 
                                                 
15 We  acknowledge  the  positive  role  of  these  deprecations  even  if  they  were  results  of  autonomous  or  even 
contagious capital markets’ flows as what matters to us is their correlation with increasing unemployment.  
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3.3  Summary of results 
In  the  section  above  we  showed  in  detail  adjustment  mechanisms  in  each  country  under 
investigation. Adjustment mechanism proved to be remarkably heterogeneous across countries. 
This observation is confirmed in the Table 2 that presents estimates that related annual change in 
domestic  unit  labour  costs  to  the  changes  in  unemployment  rate.  First  six  coefficients  can  be 
interpreted as the overall labour market elasticity in respective countries, while fixed effects show 
ULC growth rates at stable unemployment. 
Table 2. Domestic Unit Labour Costs elasticities to unemployment growth in analysed countries 
Dependent Variable: ULCG4? 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 11/04/03   Time: 04:55 
Sample(adjusted): 1994:1 2002:4 
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints 
Total panel observations 178 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
_CZE--UNEMPRG4_CZE   0.010738   0.059755   0.179698   0.8576 
_SLK--UNEMPRG4_SLK  -0.255942   0.067802  -3.774842   0.0002 
_HUN--UNEMPRG4_HUN  -0.011475   0.225145  -0.050969   0.9594 
_POL--UNEMPRG4_POL  -0.120001   0.072953  -1.644908   0.1018 
_LAT--UNEMPRG4_LAT  -0.024124   0.048041  -0.502154   0.6162 
_LIT--UNEMPRG4_LIT  -0.147434   0.038817  -3.798149   0.0002 
Fixed Effects         
_CZE--C   0.011063       
_SLK--C   0.013123       
_HUN--C  -0.007251       
_POL—C  -0.019591       
_LAT—C  -0.032249       
_LIT—C   0.010266       
R-squared   0.214992      Mean dependent var  -0.012955 
Adjusted R-squared   0.162974      S.D. dependent var   0.064452 
S.E. of regression   0.058967      Sum squared resid   0.577199 
Log likelihood   535.1430      F-statistic   9.092583 
 
Slovakia,  Lithuania  and  Poland  have  domestic  unit  labour  market  costs  that  are  the  most 
responsive  to  unemployment  changes,  however  adjustments  took  place  through  very  different 
channels. Flexibility in Slovakia depended exclusively on inflation surprise, while in Poland mainly 
productivity, but also to some extent inflation surprise combined with nominal wage moderation 
played important role. Lithuania adjusted through nominal wages. On contrary, labour markets in  
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Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia seem to be remarkably inflexible. Why the last two countries 
exhibited such positive unemployment dynamics? In our interpretation, the negative average (at 
stable unemployment) ULC growth rate is the answer. Consistent real wage growth moderation 
below productivity dynamics proves to be a very good insurance against adverse shocks. Lithuania 
that generated, on average, increasing domestic unit labour costs needed very deep cuts in real 
wages after the Russian crisis, Latvia did not. It is worth noting, that Czech Republic exhibits not 
only rigidity but also ULC increasing on average. It is somehow surprising, that Poland seems to be 
have one of the most favourable outcomes that combine high flexibility with negative average ULC 
growth. If these results are taken seriously, high unemployment levels in Poland are due to factor 
more fundamental than lack of domestic unit labour cost flexibility (qualification and regional mis-
matches being probably most important).  
Figure 11. Domestic unit labour cost growth rates 
Focusing on importance of monetary policy, there are in total three episodes when inflationary 
surprise helped to reduce wage costs in the response to the negative shock: Hungary in 1997, 
Czech Republic 1998/1999 and Poland and Slovakia after the Russian crisis. In each case the 
surge in inflation allowed to permanently shift real wage trend downwards, only in Hungary this 
shift  was partly  offset  in next  periods.  This  would  suggest  that  monetary policy  might facilitate 
adjustment at  times  of  economic emergency.  However,  we  need to  take  notice  that  the  single 
largest fall in real wages and the only absolute fall in nominal wages happened in Lithuania, the 
country with currency board arrangement. This again suggests the importance of Lucas Critique, 
since the nominal wages fell only in the country where there was no other political and economic 
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instead of inducing problems due to earlier nominal wage rigidity. Hence the lack of nominal wage 
flexibility in all the rest of the analysed countries might not be as dangerous as it seems to be. 
Monetary  discretion  also  proved  to  have  costs.  Rapid  disinflation  which  followed  inflation 
surprise led to surge in real wages in all countries with independent monetary policy except for 
Poland. This surge was not justified by productivity improvements and led to unemployment growth 
to come back. Discretionary monetary policy that leads to unstable inflation might bring more harm 
than gain at normal times.  
Figure 12. Real wage growth rates 
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Figure 13.  Inflation rates 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
Our  analysis  indicates also for  important positive  role of  productivity  growth.  If productivity 
increases are not awarded  instantaneously  with  corresponding  real  wage  increases,  it enables 
much  quicker  ULC  reduction  resulting  in  possibly  less  durable  and  shallower  labour  market 
problems. In 2002 productivity in all countries grew at the rate between 2.7% and 4.7% annually. 
This implies that even at the stable inflation rate of 2% and full downward nominal wage stickiness, 
domestic unit labour costs can fall at between 4.7-6.7% annually. And we note that in last years, 
with the notable exception of adjustment following the Russian crisis, no country with independent 
monetary  policy  recorded  such  reductions  in  ULC.  Moreover  deeper  adjustments following  the 
Russian  crisis  were  achieved  exactly  by  additional  improvements  in  productivity  that  was  not 
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Figure 14. Productivity growth rates 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
On  contrary  nominal  exchange  rate  movements,  in  spite  their  short  term  impact  on  real 
exchange rates do not seem to usually play any important role in adjusting labour market through 
improving  competitiveness  against existing EMU  members  with  one  important exception of the 
aftermath of the Russian crisis. Shocks of such depth and degree of asymmetry against current 
EMU members are rather unlikely to repeat.  
Figure 15. Real depreciations rates against euro 
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These results are confirmed by the Table 3 that characterizes the elasticity of dynamics of 
international  unit  labour  costs  to  changes  in  unemployment:  only  for  Slovakia  the  elasticity  of 
international labour costs seems to marginally higher than in domestic unit labour costs.  
Table 3. International ULC elasticities to unemployment changes 
Dependent Variable: IULCG4? 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 11/18/03   Time: 22:50 
Sample(adjusted): 1994:1 2002:4 
Included observations: 36 after adjusting endpoints 
Total panel observations 183 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
_CZE--UNEMPRG4_CZE  -0.060994   0.121028  -0.503966   0.6149 
_SLK--UNEMPRG4_SLK  -0.299906   0.137809  -2.176240   0.0308 
_HUN--UNEMPRG4_HUN   0.188192   0.457644   0.411220   0.6814 
_POL--UNEMPRG4_POL  -0.160456   0.148288  -1.082053   0.2807 
_LAT--UNEMPRG4_LAT   0.506056   0.097651   5.182293   0.0000 
_LIT--UNEMPRG4_LIT  -0.104335   0.076925  -1.356319   0.1767 
Fixed Effects         
_CZE--C   0.104397       
_SLK--C   0.080625       
_HUN--C   0.081323       
_POL--C   0.060999       
_LAT--C   0.079374       
_LIT--C   0.152368       
R-squared   0.212781      Mean dependent var   
Adjusted R-squared   0.162142      S.D. dependent var   
S.E. of regression   0.119860      Sum squared resid   
Log likelihood   362.2804      F-statistic   
Source: Own calculations based on IMF-IFS data. 
4. Selected microfoundations for wage flexibility  
in future EMU members 
This part not being central for our analysis can be considered as its important supplement. 
This is a short overview of some institutional and structural characteristics of candidate countries’ 
labour markets. The data from the current EMU, ECU and OECD member states are also added. It 
is neither deep nor comprehensive picture, however we do believe it may shed some additional 
light  on  the  results  of  main  analysis  above.  We  may  see  whether  our  results  do  have  any  
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underpinning in main institutional and structural phenomena. The comparison with other countries 
gives us a more general picture of relative situation of our countries in this respect. 
We start our overview with comparison of unionisation and bargaining dialogue structures as 
this characteristic is most commonly pointed out as playing decisive role for wage flexibility (for 
example, Layard et.al, 1991).  Then  we  will  take  a  look on differences  in  tax  wedges between 
candidate and current member countries as the next possible source of wage and labour market 
rigidities, especially in the long run ( for example Alesina & Perotti 1993 or Tabellini & Daveri 
2000).  Then  we  move  to  Employment  Protection  Legislation,  which  is  also  often  blamed  for 
insufficient  wage  adjustments  through  well  known  insider-outsider  mechanism,  (comprehensive 
research  in  Lindbeck  &  Snower’s  book,  1989).  Last  but  not  least,  we  are  presenting  some 
comparisons of regional labour market differences and labour mobility data. This is not institutional 
but more structural characteristic of the labour market. It is interesting, however, for two reasons. 
At  first,  lack  of  internal  mobility  of  the  labour  force  could  hamper  the  wage  adjustments  in  a 
country. At second, regional immobility is being pointed as a main problem in current EMU states 
(Soltwedel & Dohse & Boden, 1999). At third, mobility of labour force is also viewed (according to 
OCA theory) as a possible substitute for wage flexibility.  
4.1 Unionisation, patterns of social dialog and bargaining processes – wage 
formation process 
According to, among others, Calmfors and Driffil (1989) the structure of the wage bargaining 
institutions plays the most important role in the wage formation process, and hence is of utmost 
importance from the point of view of wage rigidity/flexibility.  
According to the standard view, so called Calmfors-Driffil curve is hump shaped. It means that 
intermediate solutions, i.e., wage negotiations mainly on branch or regional level are definitely the 
worst choice from the point of view of wage rigidity. Fully de-centralised, i.e., mainly on the firm 
level or fully centralised system of wage negotiations are the best choices.  
Centralised forms  of  wage  negotiations  are dominating  in  most of  EU  accessing  countries 
(European  Commission  (EC)  2002b,  EC  2003b).  This  stems  mainly  from  relative 
underdevelopment of social dialog partner’s organisations. Employers’ organisations are especially 
week in almost all countries. Central social dialogue institutions (such as Tripartite Commission for 
example in case of Poland) seem to be well developed in all related countries. Bi-partite dialog on 
branch, regional or other multi-company level has been assessed as weak in all countries with 
exception of Slovenia. The results of central negotiations are more of informative and indicative 
then obligatory character. Often they apply only to large (often state owned) companies and to 
state administration and other public sector employees. The rest of negotiations is taking place 
mainly on companies’ level. It seems therefore that in most of accession countries the mixture of 
centralised wage bargaining (mainly for state-owned sector) and decentralised bargaining takes 
place.  Taking  into  account  the  Calmfors-Driffil  relationship,  this  mixture  should  be  perceived 
positively from the point of view of wage rigidities.   
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The data on union density and bargaining coverage in candidate countries (Table 4) are in line 
with the above characteristics. Union density is comparable to current average EU levels, it is not 
so in case of bargaining coverage. Unions are well developed mainly in big, often state-owned 
companies where large share of labour force is still being employed, for these workers wages are 
negotiated. The results of these negotiations, being conducted centrally or on firms’ level, are not 
extended to the rest of the economy. It results mainly from weaker bargaining co-ordination and 
extension practices in candidate countries (EC 2002b).  
One has to remember, however, about the dominance of the employees’ side over employers’ 
in  negotiations  on  any  level  in  candidate  countries  and  also  about  the  strong  political  role 
employees’  organisation  possess.  It  stems  from  their  strong  positions  in  big  post-communists 
enterprises or even branches characterised (at least in case of Poland) by most rigid wages in 
economy which thus far have to be restructured. This political strength is especially important when 
we  take  into  account  the  relative  significance  of  centralised-tripartite  consultations  in  these 
countries.  
Table 4. Bargaining Coverage Rates and Union Coverage in Selected European  
and Candidate Countries 
  Union Density 2000  Collective Bargaining Coverage (2000) 
SELECTED EU COUNTRIES 
Belgium  69  96 
Denmark  88  69 
Germany  30  79 
Spain  15  83 
France  9  95 
Ireland  45  66 
UK  29  39 
ACCESSING COUNTRIES 
Cyprus  70  68 
Czech Rep.  30  28 
Estonia  15  29 
Hungary  20  34 
Lithuania  15  13 
Latvia  30  15 
Malta  65   
Poland  15  40 
Slovenia  41  100 
Slovakia  40  48 
  




EU  44  78 
EMU area  39  81 
Accession Countries  34  42 
Source: Employment in Europe 2003, EC, DG Employment Report 
From the group of 6 countries being analysed in our paper Lithuania has both smallest union 
density and bargaining coverage. The latter is also very limited in Latvia, with density being on 
average levels. In the course of our empirical research we found out that nominal and real wages 
are  most  flexible  in  these  two  countries.  The  most  rigid  nominal  and  real  wages  have  been 
observed in Slovakia and Czech Republic, with the first of those having both highest union density 
and bargaining coverage of all. Obviously these results do not prove anything, as it would require 
more sophisticated analysis. They provide, however, some kind of stimulus for deeper analysis of 
possible  relationship  between  bargaining,  or  even  general  social  dialogue  structure  and  wage 
flexibility in candidate countries. 
4.2  Tax wedge 
Relatively high tax wedges are very important problem for most of Accession Countries and all 
Central  European  ones.  High  employer’s  and/or  employee’s  contributions  to  the  social  system 
decide about the size of the wedge in most of countries.  
Figure 16. Tax wedge in EU and accession countries in year 2002 
Source: OECD Taxing Wages 2002 Report relate to average wages, with exception of Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia for which data come from “Employment in Europe 2003” Report of DG Employment and 
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High  tax  wedge  could  influence  negatively  wage  flexibility,  especially  in  case  of  poorly 
educated  low-earners  characterised  by  low  productivity.  The  take-home  wage  offered  to  low 
productivity workers by employer’s may easily fall very close or even below the subsistence level 
and/or below accessible non-wage incomes, such as social system and/or shadow economy in the 
country or legal (but more probably) illegal job in foreign countries. It has to be taken into account 
that post-communist economies are abundant of this kind of labour force and the unemployment 
(broader non-employment) is mainly localised in this group. It means that high tax wedge may be 
of special importance for total wage flexibility in these countries.  
Unfortunately most of accessing countries have relatively high tax wedges (Figure 17), also for 
the  low-earners  group,  locating  them  in  the  middle  of  European  rates.  Cyprus  and  Malta,  not 
analysed in this paper but also structurally different from the rest of accessing countries, are the 
only two countries significantly different in this respect. Tax wedges among the rest of accessing 
countries, including six countries from our analysis, are practically the same disabling us to look for 
any relationship between tax wedges and observed wage flexibility.  
4.3  Employment Protection indices 
Employment protection is the next institutional factor possibly influencing the scope of wage 
flexibility. Logical argument for that is quite simple. The more legally protected are jobs the more 
reluctant are employees to accept wage cuts in case of adverse shocks. 
Obviously  any  comparative  aggregated  measures  of  legal  systems  have  to  be  taken  with 
caution  (Boeri  &  Bertola  1993).  Similar  legal  rules  may  work  completely  differently  in  various 
institutional environments. Nevertheless such measures are being created and are commonly used 
by labour economists. The Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index is the measure we are 
using in our paper. It has been created by OECD, and is recently popularly used and cited (Ribaud 
et.al. 2000, Sveinar 2002). It tries to measure separately and then combine three dimension of 
legal  labour  market  environment:  protection  of  regular  contracts,  rules  concerning  temporary 
contracts and limitations to collective dismissals. From the point of their possible influence on wage 
flexibility, it seems that the first and also to some extent the last dimension should draw our special 
attention.  
EPL indexes in Accession Countries are not much different from these observed in the rest of 
Europe. Only Slovenian regulations seem to approach the strict regulations of Southern European 
markets. On the other hand however, none of accession countries is close, in this respect, to most 
successful European labour markets such as Ireland or United Kingdom. It has to be taken into 
account that some of the Accession Countries such us: Poland, Estonia, Slovakia introduced in 
years 2000-2003 the Labour Code reforms the main aim of which was to make EPL more flexible. 
(EC  2003b).  It  seems  therefore  that  EPL  should  rather  not  decide  about  differences  in  wage-
rigidities between current and future EURO-zone members.   
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Unfortunately  the  OECD  EPL  analysis  has  not  been  performed  for  all  of  6  countries  we 
analysed. We do not have data for Lithuania and Latvia with most flexible wages, what would be of 
utmost  importance  for  us.  Taking  into  account  data  from  other  countries  legal  labour  market 
environment  is  most  rigid  in  Slovakia  and  Czech  Republic.  It  stems  mainly  from  more  rigid 
regulations  concerning permanent  contracts  and  collective dismissals  being  the  most  plausible 
suspects to influence wage rigidity. On the hand, labour market in Hungary seems to be relatively 
legally flexible also taking into account only this two factors. (Table 5) 
Table 5. Employment protection summary indices in selected European, OECD and EU accession 
countries in late 90s  
  Regular*  Temporary  Collective    RT  RTC 
Portugal  4,3**  3  3,6    3,7  3,7 
Italy  2,8  3,8  4,1    3,3  3,4 
Spain  2,6  3,5  3,1    3,1  3,1 
France  2,3  3,6  2,1    3  2,8 
Germany  2,8  2,3  3,1    2,5  2,6 
Ireland  1,6  0,3  2,1    0,9  1,1 
UK  0,8  0,3  2,9    0,5  0,9 
             
EU  2,4  2,1  3,2    2,2  2,4 
CEEC 
Average 
2,7  1,2  4,1    2  2,4 
             
Slovenia  3,4  2,4  4,8    2,9  3,5 
Estonia  3,1  1,4  4,1    2,3  2,6 
Slovakia  2,6  1,4  4,4    2  2,4 
Czech Rep  2,8  0,5  4,3    1,7  2,1 
Poland  2,2  1  3,9    1,6  2 
Hungary  2,1  0,6  3,4    1,4  1,7 
Source: Ribaud et. al 2002 
*“Regular” refers  to  Employment  Protection (EP)  of  standard  contracts; “Temporary”  to  EP  of  temporary  contracts; 
“Collective” to regulations concerning collective dismissals; RT – is the combination of the first two’ RTC – of all three. 
**The bigger the number the more legally rigid is the labour market, the scale is 0-6. 
4.4  Regional differences and mobility of labour 
Regional variation of unemployment rates in candidate countries does not seem bigger then in 
current EMU and EU member states. Regional variations in such countries as Italy and Spain are 
much bigger than in any even most severely heterogeneous candidate countries, which are in this 
respect  comparable  to  Germany  or  France.  In  Western  Europe  (with  exception  of  Belgium), 
however, regional serious disparities may be observed practically only in territorially large states.  
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On the other hand, in Eastern Europe Bulgaria and Slovakia, which can not be considered as big, 
are characterised by most severe disparities.  
This is obviously related to much lower population’s mobility in candidate states, the simplest 
explanation for each lies in the worse transportation infrastructure, underdeveloped housing market 
and  lower  GDP  per  capita.  The  comparison  of Figures  18  and  19  clearly  shows  that  regional 
differences are strictly correlated with immobility. With Belgians, Spaniards and Greeks being both 
the least mobile nations in Europe, and their countries suffering with highest regional disparities. 
Taking this into account it seems that immobility of labour force in candidate countries may be a 
big problem of their labour markets in nearest future. It is, however, quite hard to say whether 
joining the EURO area will result in this problem being more serious then currently. As suggested 
by Slotwedel, Dohse and Boden (1999). it might become a problem if joining the EMU requires 
unjustified harmonisation of labour market institution between regions and countries. 
Unfortunately we do not have data on regional unemployment disparities and mobility for all 6 
countries we analyse. Data for Lithuania and Latvia are lacking. What we can observe however is 
that  Slovakia  is  the  country  with  highest  regional  disparities  and  lowest  labour  force  mobility. 
Regional disparity in Czech Republic is similar to Polish, with the former being much smaller than 
the  latter.  It  seems  to  coincide  with  observed  differences  in  wage  rigidities  between  these 
countries.  
Figure 17. Maximum regional differences in Unemployment Rates in selected Candidate and EU 
countries. Data for 2001 































































































































                       Studies & Analyses  No. 265 – Future EMU Membership and Wage Flexibility…. 
42 
Figure 18. Percent of population aged 15-64 changing the residence for various years in selected 
countries 
Source: For US Jackman and Savouri 1998, for Czech Republic and Slovakia Fidrmuc 2002, for Poland own calculation 
based on LFS II’2002, for the rest of countries Employment in Europe 2002, EC Report.  
Note: Data for USA, Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to entire adult population. 
5. General Conclusions 
Summing up, our analysis indicates that with the exception of Lithuania nominal wages are not 
flexible  in  candidate  countries,  what  usually  is  regarded  as  the  strong  evidence  against  the 
participation  in  the  EMU.  The  degree  of  wage  rigidity  varies  significantly  among  analysed 
countries. It seems, however, that fast productivity growth create the environment in which unit 
labour can adjust despite nominal stickiness and through moderation of real wage dynamics. This 
structural feature would remain crucial after accession to the EMU. It is also quite possible that 
change of monetary regime would result in more nominal wage flexibility as suggested by example 
of Lithuania.  
Inflationary surprises proved to play important role in adjustments to major adverse shocks 
triggering  real  wage  adjustments  that  were  not fully  reversed  afterwards.    On  the  other  hand, 
however, our analysis indicates that at normal times the discretionary monetary policy was more 
often a shock generator than shock absorber.  
Nominal  exchange  rate  movements  played  some  role  in  the  adjustment  after  the  Russian 
crisis. In all other times, in spite of their short term impact on real exchange rates they did not 
seem to be correlated with labour market situation. It is therefore our impression, that theory of 
OCA  theory  does  not  shed  much  light  about  possible  unemployment  consequences  of  EMU 
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members  as  Russian  crisis  are  rather  unlikely  to  repeat,  even  though  large  fluctuation  in 
EURO/USD exchange rates may imply severe adjustment problems for some candidate countries.  
Finally, experience of countries of most favourable unemployment dynamics suggest, that unit 
labour costs falling in the long run provide the best insurance against adverse economic shocks. 
There is no unanimous evidence that real wage growth lower on average than productivity growth 
would  be  more  difficult  to  generate  inside  rather  than  outside  monetary  union
16.  Moreover,  if 
bargaining is increasingly taking place at the European level, it is generally favourable for countries 
with better than average productivity dynamics, such as candidates countries, as low real wage 
dynamics might be imported from slow growing mature economies. This optimistic conclusion is 
obviously  reversed  if  levels  rather  than  dynamics  of  wages  in  existing  EMU  members  start  to 
influence wage bargainers in candidate countries. 
There is some prima face evidence for relationship between some institutional and structural 
characteristics of candidate countries labour markets and observed wage flexibility. The most clear 
evidence has been found in case of bargaining structure, where especially bargaining coverage 
rate seemed to be positively correlated with wage rigidity. Limited evidence has also been found in 
case of employment protection and labour force mobility. No evidence could be found in case of 
tax wedge. However, results of this supplementary part of our research can not be treated as 
conclusive.  They  show  to  some  extent  possible  fields  for  further  more  rigorous  and  in-depth 
research. 
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Annex. Potentially destabilising capital good flows   
Another  interesting  and  highly  controversial  question  is  whether  capital  movements  can 
substitute for all other missing adjustment channels. Positive answer would be very encouraging as 
high  capital  mobility  characterises  existing  EMU  members  and  increasingly  also  candidate 
economies.  Unfortunately,  we  hold  opposite  view.  In  our  understanding  capital  mobility  might 
actually  aggravate  asymmetries  in  economic  performance  among  EMU  member  states 
characterised by  high  labour  market  rigidities.  It  should be noted  here,  that unlike  many  other 
authors we define capital mobility as the actual international mobility of fixed assets (physical stock 
as machines and equipment) rather than simply financial flows in the balance of payment.  
The simple rationale for potentially destabilising role of such defined capital flows is illustrated 
in the Figure 1A with initial equilibrium as defined in the section one of the main body of this paper. 
As the demand for country’s products falls, capital operates below its full capacity and the real 
return on invested assets is diminished. This prompts capital outflow which reduces production 
potential of the economy and therefore shifts the aggregate supply curve to the left. If we assume 
that nominal wages are downward rigid the fall in output is therefore even more pronounced under 
capital mobility and given lack of international labour mobility, the increase in unemployment is 
even  larger.  High  capital  mobility  seems  to  be  another  reason  for  enhanced  labour  market 
flexibility, rather than a substitute for it17.  
Figure A1. Negative trade shock and capital outflow 
 
                                                 
17 This insight is confirmed by the experience of economically depressed regions characterized by rigid wages as 
Southern Italy or Eastern Germany. These regions fail to attract fixed asset investment but their external imbalances are 
financed through fiscal transfers. In the international context, portfolio capital inflow can indeed finance current account 
deficits of Hungary, however the fixed asset investments would be negative aggravating the underlining competitiveness 
problem. This negative impact might be particularly important in case of shocks of longer duration. This story is also in 
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Below we present a simple microeconomic model that supports the thesis that high capital 
mobility might provide another justification for enhancing nominal wage flexibility, rather than to 
substitute for it. This is particularly so in the context of monetary integration and low international 
migrations. 
A  small  open  economy  that  considers  joining  the  monetary  union  is  characterised  by  the 
simple Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
a a - =
1 L AK Y
 
 
where Y is output, K is capital stock, L is employed labour, A measures total factor productivity 
and  > Î< 1 , 0 a is the elasticity of substitution between two factors of production. Labour force is 
fixed as international migrations are zero. Capital stock is a physical good that can be employed 
domestically and in the case of capital immobility is fixed within the country. Profit maximisation 
implies that remuneration of two factors of productions corresponds to their respective marginal 
productivities: 
 
      (1) 
 
          (2) 
 
 
where R is nominal rental cost of capital, W is nominal wage and P is domestic product price 
expressed in the domestic currency units. We also assume that union (and world) aggregate price 
level expressed in union currency is P*, wage level is W* and rental price of capital is R*. We 
assume further the equilibrium relative price of domestically and foreign produced good is S so 
that: 
 
* SEP P =                                                                                      (3) 
 
where E is the nominal exchange rate. When capital stock is internationally mobile, the rental 
cost of capital in different countries must be equalised, so that:  
 
* ER R =               (4) 
 
For simplicity we assume that union price level and rental price of capital P* and R* are fixed. 
We  combine  equation  (1)  and  (2)  to  get  the  equilibrium  condition  in  the  labour  market  (1’). 
Equilibrium condition in capital good market is expressed by equation (2’) when capital is immobile 
across borders and (2’’) when capital is mobile. The former is just alternative restatement of (2), 
a a a
- - × = =
1 1L AK MPK
P
R 
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the latter is derived as a combination of (2) and (4). Lower cases denote respective upper case 
variables but in logarithms and as deviations from the initial equilibrium values.   
 
) ( l k e s a w - + + + = a       (1’) 
) )( 1 ( l k e s a r - - - + + = a     (2’) 
) )( 1 ( 0 l k s a - - - + = a       (2’’) 
       
Economic interpretation of these equations is obvious and will be discussed when we analyze 
patterns of adjustment to country specific shocks. One shock has supply side character and is 
captured  as  a  change  in  productivity  level  A.  Change  is  S  reflects  possible  trade  shock  that 
modifies  equilibrium  relative  price  between  domestic  and  foreign  goods.  Positive  s  implies  an 
improvement in terms of trade.  
We consider four cases. We always assume that nominal rental cost of capital is perfectly 
flexible and labour is internationally immobile. What distinguish scenarios are assumptions about 
zero/full capital mobility and flexibility/rigidity of nominal wages. Under each scenario we discuss 
adjustment mechanisms within the monetary union and with flexible exchange rates.  
Four cases of adjustment 
    Nominal wages 
    flexible  rigid 
zero  1  2  International  
capital mobility  full  4  3 
A1. Capital is internationally immobile and nominal wages are flexible 
When  capital  is  internationally  immobile  and  wage  flexible,  equilibrium  conditions 
corresponding to equations (1’) and (2’) are respectively: 
 
s a w + =  
s a r + =  
 
when the country is part of the monetary union.  When depreciation of the domestic currency is 
possible two conditions collapse into one: 
 
) ( s a e + - =  
 
Within  the  union  both  nominal  rental  cost  of  capital  and  wages  fall  to  offset  the  negative 
productivity shock and/or deterioration in the terms of trade. While the same adjustment could be 
achieved through nominal exchange rate appreciation if the country remained outside the union, 
the monetary regime is not of consequence for this economy with flexible wages. Nominal wage 
and exchange rate flexibility are substitutes.   
                                                 Studies & Analyses  No. 265 – Artur Radziwiłł, Mateusz Walewski 
49 
A2. Capital is internationally immobile and nominal wages are downward rigid 
As wages are fixed, the only variable that can equilibrate the system is employment. Equations 
corresponding to (1’) and (2’) are respectively: 
 
As a result unemployment emerges. We note that the fall in rental cost of capital is now higher 
than in case of flexible wages. It is because effects of initial shocks on the marginal product of 
capital are strengthened by lower labour input. However, this fall in rental price of capital has also 
the role of cushioning the severity of unemployment as we will clearly show in case 2.  
 
For  country  with  rigid  nominal  wages,  possibility  of  depreciation  is  quite  attractive  as 
adjustment  can  be  achieved  without  falling  employment.  Again  there  is  only  one  equilibrium 
condition for both labour and capital markets. 
 
) ( s a e + - =  
 
A3. Capital is internationally mobile and nominal wages are downward rigid 
Unlike in the first two cases, the capital is now mobile; therefore it flees the country with the 
lower  rental  cost  of  capital.  Labour  market  equilibrium  equation  (1’)  and  equation  (2’’)  that 







This system of two equations does not have a solution and in economic terms is implosive: 
capital outflow and employment reduction are reinforcing. As labour market adjustment requires 
increase  in  capital/labour  ratio  through  employment  reductions  and  capital  market  adjustment 
requires  decrease  in  capital/labour  ratio  through  capital  outflows,  the  economy  is  constantly 
shrinking. Potential disaster can be avoided only if at some point nominal wages start to fall or the 
country  drops  out  of  the  monetary  union  or  suspend  free  capital  mobility.  The  mobile  capital 
therefore makes creation of the monetary union in the area of very rigid nominal wage potentially 
dangerous.  
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If a depreciation of the currency is possible, equation (1’) and (2’’) can be solved readily: 
 
 
Unemployment is avoided. It should be noted, however, that the depreciation necessary to 
retain the full employment is higher than in the case of no capital flows. Restoring competitiveness 
of domestic workers is more difficult now, as their work is supported with less fixed assets due to 
capital outflow. Aggregate output is also reduced. 
 
A4. Capital is internationally mobile and nominal wages are flexible 
 
In the case 3 we showed that international capital mobility aggravates strongly unemployment 
costs  of  absolute  downward  nominal  wage  rigidity.  In  this  section  we  show  that  capital  flows 





As we have seen before, the capital is leaving the country in response to the negative shock, 
what further reduces marginal product of labour. In order to sustain the full employment, wages 
need to fall more than it was the case without capital mobility. High capital mobility requires higher 
wage adjustment and again leads to the fall in output. However, unlike in the case of rigid wages, it 
does not lead to downward spiral in employment and product. Finally, wage flexibility proves to be 
the  perfect  substitute  for  nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility  also  under  the  full  capital  mobility 




The simple theoretical framework presented above does not discuss and is not intended to 
question numerous benefits of international capital flows that include supporting the catching up 
process and ensuring static and dynamic efficiencies. It shows solely that capital is very unlikely to 
flow to countries (or regions) in depressed economic condition. Returns on investments tend to be 
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low in these unfortunate areas and capital is not altruistic. Capital mobility can therefore aggravate 
rather than offset negative asymmetric shocks. However this is the rigidity in labour markets that 
make this normal profit maximising behaviour potentially dangerous for economic stability. The 
lesson for policy makers is that capital markets would punish rather than substitute for neglected 
labour reforms and this is particularly true within the monetary union. 
 